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Abstract
Dealers trading in a limit order market must choose both the order aggressiveness and the quantity
for their orders. We empirically investigate how dealers jointly make these decisions in the foreign
exchange market using a unique simultaneous equations model. The model uses an ordered probit
model to account for the discrete nature of order aggressiveness and a censored regression model
to capture the clustering of orders placed at the smallest available quantity, $1 million. We ﬁnd
evidence of a clear trade-off between order aggressiveness and quantity: more aggressive orders
tend to be smaller in size. The increased competition (demand) suggested by increased depth on
the same (opposite) side of the market leads to less (more) aggressive orders in smaller (larger)
size. This holds for the depths at both the best and off-best prices, even though off-best depths are
not observable to dealers.
JEL classiﬁcation: G14
Bank classiﬁcation: Exchange rates; Financial markets
Résumé
Les placeurs d’ordres sur un marché avec carnet doivent décider à la fois de la compétitivité et de
la taille de l’ordre. Au moyen de leur propre modèle à équations simultanées, les auteurs étudient
empiriquement comment ces décisions sont prises en commun sur le marché des changes. Leur
modèle englobe un modèle probit ordonné et un modèle de régression avec données censurées
pour tenir compte respectivement de la nature discrète de la compétitivité des ordres et du fait
qu’un grand nombre des ordres ont la taille minimale (qui est d’un million de dollars). Les auteurs
constatent la présence d’un arbitrage clair entre la compétitivité et la taille des ordres : les ordres
les plus compétitifs sont généralement de taille plus faible. La concurrence (demande) accrue
qu’implique une hausse de la profondeur du même côté (du côté opposé) du carnet encourage la
soumission d’ordres moins (plus) compétitifs portant sur de plus petits (plus gros) montants. Ce
résultat se vériﬁe aussi bien aux meilleures limites qu’aux autres prix du carnet, même si les
cambistes ne peuvent observer la profondeur des ordres qu’aux meilleures limites.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G14
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Taux de change; Marchés ﬁnanciers1
Introduction:
In a limit order market, traders submitting an order must choose both the order aggressiveness 
and quantity. We define order aggressiveness by the execution priority.  Market orders are the most
aggressive, as they are executed immediately, and limit orders are less aggressive because their execution 
is not guaranteed and they follow strict price and time priorities in execution. Despite the dual nature of
order submissions, much of the literature focuses on order aggressiveness (i.e., Griffiths et al. (2000), 
Cao, Hansch and Wang (2004), and Ranaldo (2004)). In these studies, the quantity dimension is ignored 
or treated as explanatory variables rather than a choice variable.  A notable exception is Moulton (2003)
who allows traders to choose quantity but only at the existing price. The study did not examine the 
potential trade off that dealers make between price and quantity.
Since traders choose both order aggressiveness and quantity when submitting orders in a limit 
order market, we simultaneously estimate the choice of order aggressiveness and quantity.  Using the 
simultaneous equations method in Nelson, Forrest and Olsen (1978), we formally examine the trade-off
between order aggressiveness and quantity, conditioning on the state of the limit order book. Though 
order aggressiveness has been modeled before, including the joint role of quantity is new. In the
simultaneous equations model, order aggressiveness is estimated using an ordered probit model, as in 
Griffiths et al. (2000), Cao, Hansch and Wang (2004), and Ranaldo (2004).  This accommodates the
discrete nature of prices.
1  Quantity is modeled using a censored regression framework, which
accommodates the minimum order size of $1 million and the clustering of orders at $1 million.
Our study makes several contributions to the market microstructure literature.  The first
contribution is to more completely model the order submission process. Our model captures both the
simultaneous nature of the price-quantity decision as well as many of the empirical features of the data –
price clustering, quantity censorship etc.  We also extend the standard definition of the decision to cancel 
an order.  Most studies only investigate order submissions and those which consider both submissions and 
cancellations (e.g. Cao, Hansch and Wang (2004)) treat the cancellation of an order as the least aggressive 
type of order submission. The cancellation of limit orders is, however, conditional upon there having been 2
an earlier submission.  Because cancellation is not a choice available to all dealers – it is only available to 
those who have already submitted an order – treating cancellation as the least aggressive type of order 
submission is not appropriate.  Another important element of the cancellation decision is that limit orders 
may be cancelled at different levels of order aggressiveness (i.e., at the best price or behind the best price) 
so all order cancellations are not the same. As a result, we model limit order submissions and
cancellations separately
2.
Second our study uses data on firm orders submitted to the Reuters D-2000-2 system in the 
Deutsche Mark-U.S. dollar market. This differs from the majority of studies in this area which focus on 
U.S. equities markets and allows us to benefit from some of the differences in market structures. The
system allows dealers to submit both market and limit orders twenty-four hours a day. Although every 
order submitted is observable in the dataset
3, dealers using the Reuters D-2000-2 system only observe the 
best price and corresponding quantity posted on both sides of the market and the most recent transaction 
activity. Since we have more information than dealers, we are able to determine whether the information 
from the orders not directly observable by dealers affects their price and quantity decisions. If this
information is relevant, this would be consistent with dealers using other sources (e.g., their private
customer base) to obtain relevant information on the state of the market which they use in making their
decisions at each point in time.
We find that overall traders are hesitant to submit more aggressive orders.  They are least likely to 
submit market orders, than limit orders at the best price and limit orders improving the best price.
Considering both prices and quantities, we find a negative tradeoff between order aggressiveness and 
quantity –  the quantity tends to be smaller when the order is more aggressive. Further, there is evidence 
that dealers split large, aggressive orders into smaller orders because the submission of both $1-million
market orders and aggressive limit orders on the same side of the market are positively autocorrelated
4.
Traders split orders for many reasons such as small market orders revealing less information and their 
individual price impact is smaller than one large market order which may have to walk up the order book 
to be completely filled. If the order book is resilient (i.e., limit orders arrive to refill the order book3
quickly after orders are executed), then breaking up large orders into small ones entails less execution 
cost.  A further advantage of small, aggressive limit orders is that they face less risk of being picked-off if 
the value of the asset moves against the dealer and he cannot cancel the order in time.
Considering the impact of depth at different price levels on both sides of  the order book, we find 
that dealers submit less aggressive orders with smaller sizes as market depth increases at the best price on 
the same side of the market.  These results are consistent with the “crowding out” effect of Parlour (1998) 
where dealers avoid submitting more aggressive limit orders on the same side of the market to avoid 
competing with those orders.  But different from empirical studies such as. Ellul et al. (2003) which
suggest that traders compete to obtain priority in the order book by submitting more aggressive orders as 
the depth on the same-side of the market deepens. As depth decreases on the other side of the market, we 
find dealers are more willing to submit aggressive orders since they are less concerned about their orders 
walking up / down the order book to be executed.
Changes in market conditions also impact order submissions. As measures of market uncertainty 
(e.g., volatility and spread) increase, we find that both ask and bid orders become more aggressive and 
orders are larger in size. As in Cohen et al. (1981) this indicates that dealers want to ensure their orders 
are executed in an uncertain market. This also suggests that after the arrival of new information resulting 
in a widening of the spread, dealers update their information set and use this to place more aggressive 
orders which undo the previous change in the spread. This is consistent with Engle and Patton (2004) who
find that the best bid and ask prices are cointegrated and revert to their equilibrium value after a shock.
Considering the impact of residual volatility (volatility from only the bid or ask side), we find that dealers 
submit less aggressive orders (i.e. more behind best limit orders) when price uncertainty comes from the 
same side of the market, thereby reducing their risk of being picked-off. However, dealers submit more 
aggressive orders (i.e. best limit orders, marketable limit order and market orders) when price uncertainty
comes from the opposite side of the market. 
The paper develops as follows.  In the next section we discuss the data used.  Section two
presents our empirical model and our hypotheses.  The third section discusses the results from the basic 4
model.  Section four considers how the performance of the market affects the submission and cancellation 
decisions and the final section concludes.
1. Data
We use data for the Deutsche Mark - US dollar exchange rate from the Reuters D2000-2 system 
from the evening of the 5
th of October to midnight on the 10
th of October 1997.  D2000-2 is an electronic 
order book to which foreign exchange dealers can submit both market and limit orders. Subscribers see 
the best bid and best ask quotes, the size supplied at these prices, the exact time they arrived, whether the 
quote is a limit order or market order, whether the quote is bid side or ask side initiated, and the entry and 
exit time of the quote. We do not have information on the identity of the dealer submitting the order. As a 
result, we treat each submitted order as an independent submission conditional on the state of the limit 
order book.  Although we observe every order submitted to the market, dealers can only observe the best 
bid and ask prices, their associated quantity and the most recent transactions. They can not observe the 
limit orders posted at off-best prices nor their cancellation. They do, however, have information from 
other sources such as the Reuters’ EFX page as well as their own customer order flow. Due to an
unexpected change in interest rates by the Bundesbank on October 9
th, 1997 and its unusual impact on the 
foreign exchange trading activity following the event (for a discussion see Carlson and Lo (2004)), we 
exclude this day from our sample. 
The use of the foreign exchange market has several advantages over the more commonly used 
equity data.  First, the foreign exchange market does not have specific opening and closing procedures. 
Also, there is no market maker or features such as “iceberg orders” which may have unexpected impacts 
on the observed market liquidity.  Thus, our dataset allows us to more completely study how the supply 
and demand for this currency pair develop over the day and influence dealers’ decisions.  This data set 
therefore provides an ideal environment within which to study how order aggressiveness and quantity are 
impacted by changes in the state of the limit order book. Another advantage of this dataset is that, despite 
the short time span of the dataset, it is the only dataset available with complete information on the limit 5
order book in the inter-dealer foreign exchange market. Other studies such as Evans and Lyons (2004a), 
Evans and Lyons (2004b), Osler (2003) and Mende, Menhkoff and Osler (2005) use information from a 
single dealer. Our study complements theirs in examining the trading activities of all dealers in this 
market. Further, the Deutsche Mark - US dollar was the most heavily traded currency pair before the
introduction of Euro. The size of the market limits potential problems resulting from illiquid trading, 
information asymmetries and other errors in the measurement of microstructure characteristics.  Although 
only 37% of brokered trade in the inter-dealer market occurred on the Reuter’s platform in 1997 (Payne
(1999)), understanding this market is increasingly important as around 85% of the interdealer trade in 
major currencies currently goes through the electronic limit order book (Sager and Taylor (2005)).
Without any other limit order book data available in the foreign exchange market, this dataset provides a 
unique perspective into the order submission strategies of dealers in this highly liquid market. 
The complete data set consists of 130,526 quotes. Because we focus on order submission and 
cancellation activities during the most active trading period – from 7:00 to 16:00 (GMT) (see Figure 1) –
the dataset we use consists of 91,086 submitted quotes and 48,455 cancellations. Table 1 breaks-down
the order aggressiveness of these order submissions into six categories: market orders (17%), marketable 
limit orders (11%), best limit orders improving existing best price (14%), best limit orders placed at the 
best price (23%), off-best limit orders within 1 pip of the best price (11%) and off-best limit orders more
than 1 pip away from the best price (24%). The proportions are similar for the ask side and the bid side of 
the market. Table 1 also shows the proportion of different order sizes in each category. A general
observation is that orders cluster at $1 million – the minimum quantity allowed to be submitted on the 
Reuters D2000-2 system.  The percentages of $1 million orders ranges from 34% for marketable limit 
orders to 64% for off-best limit orders placed at more than 1 pip from the best price and are similar for the 
ask and the bid sides of the market. Because of this clustering at the minimum quantity, we use a censored 
regression model for quantity in the empirical analysis. For order cancellations, since market and
marketable limit orders cannot be cancelled, we only break order aggressiveness into three categories: 6
limit orders cancelled at the best price (36%), limit orders cancelled within 2 pips of the best price (30%) 
and limit orders cancelled at 2 pips away from the best price (34%). 
Table 2 illustrates how the order aggressiveness and quantity of orders change over the trading 
day. We find relatively more market orders in the morning and less at the end of the trading day and 
relatively more best limit orders, especially best orders improving the existing best price, in the latter half 
of the trading day.  This suggests that as the asymmetry of information narrows over the trading day, the 
pick-off risk decreases so dealers are increasingly willing to place limit orders consistent with
Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2004).  Cancellation activities mirror those of submissions. There are
relatively more best limit orders cancelled in the morning while more limit orders at prices more than 2 
pips away from the best price are cancelled at the end of the trading day.  Because of the more efficient 
pricing over the day, the execution risk of off-best limit orders is higher at the end of the day, so there are 
relatively more off-best orders cancelled and replaced by best orders at this time.
Turning to the quantities, we find that the proportion of $1 million orders submitted and cancelled 
declines whereas the proportion of larger orders increases over the trading day.  This pattern suggests that 
the size of orders increases as information asymmetries decline over the trading day. 
In studying the trade-off between order aggressiveness and quantity, we condition on the state of 
the limit order book using a set of explanatory variables. The summary statistics for these explanatory 
variables are presented in Table 3. An interesting observation is that the depth on the bid side of the 
market is larger than on the ask side. This is true at both the best and off-best prices. Not only is the bid 
side of the market deeper, the difference between the best and the worst prices is also smaller for the bid 
side of the market. This suggests that the bid side of the market is more liquid, both in terms of depth and 
the slope of the price schedule. 
2. Model:
We empirically model the simultaneous nature of the order aggressiveness and quantity of orders 
submitted in a limit order market.  By formally accounting for both of these characteristics of the orders 7
submitted to the limit order book, our model extends the existing work which only considers certain order 
aggressiveness – quantity combinations.  We also extend these studies by modeling the order submission 
and cancellation decisions separately – we do not assume cancellations are simply the least aggressive 
form of order submission as in most existing studies.
2.1 Order submission – Simultaneous Ordered Probit and Quantity Regressions
To investigate the order submission process, we jointly model the order aggressiveness and
quantity decisions.  For our analysis we define order aggressiveness based on the priority of execution.
Specifically dealers choose between submitting 1) market orders (for immediate execution at the best 
available price), 2) marketable limit orders (limit orders at prices better than the best price standing on the 
opposite side of the market), 3) best limit orders placed at prices better than the existing best price, 4) best 
limit orders placed at the existing best price, 5) off-best orders placed within one pip of the best price, or 
6) off-best orders placed more than one pip away from the best price. Formally, we model this by
assuming the vector of the discrete choices of order submissions of type,  s I , depends on the latent order 
aggressiveness variable, 
*
s I , which is assumed to be continuous. The latent order aggressiveness is related 
to the choice of order type as follows
Is = 1 if  1
* µ ≤ < ∞ − s I  (off-best limit order placed more than 1 pip away from the best quote)
= 2 if  2
*
1 µ µ ≤ < s I  (off-best limit order placed within 1 pip of the best quote
= 3 if  3
*
2 µ µ ≤ < s I  (best order placed at the existing best quote)
=4 if  4
*
3 µ µ ≤ < s I (best order improving the existing best quote)
=5 if  5
*
4 µ µ ≤ < s I (marketable limit order)
=6 if  ∞ ≤ <
*
5 s I µ (market order)
where 5 ...., , 2 , 1 , = i i µ , are the thresholds to be estimated. 8
For the quantity, the minimum quantity one can place in the limit order book is $1 million and 
about half of all orders cluster at this quantity. Therefore we adopt a censored regression framework
where the observable quantity,  s qn , depends on the latent quantity, 
*











We estimate both the latent order aggressiveness and the latent quantity within a simultaneous
equation framework. The latent order aggressiveness variable, 
*
s I , depends on the latent quantity, 
*
s qn ,





* s s s I I
s
I
s s x qn I ε β γ + + = (1)
where
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s z x x =  consists of a set of predetermined variables, 
s x , and a set of predetermined variables not in the quantity equation, 
* I
x z , for identification purpose. The 
latent order aggressiveness is estimated within an ordered probit framework. Turning to the specification 












s z x x = combines the same set of predetermined variables, xs, as for equation (1) as well 
as the predetermined variables not in the latent price regression, 
qn
x z , for identification purposes. Equation 
(2) is estimated using a censored regression model. 
The two equations are estimated using a method analogous to the two-stage least squares method 
of Nelson, Forrest and Olsen (1978).  In the first stage, we estimate the reduced-form equations to obtain 
the instruments for the order aggressiveness
*
*' ˆ ˆ* s I
s I s x I ϕ = using an ordered probit model and for the
quantity
qn
x s x n q ' ˆ ˆ φ =  using a censored regression model. In the second stage,  * ˆ
s I  replaces its counterpart 
in the quantity equation and the quantity equation is estimated via a censored regression model. Similarly, 9
s n q ˆ  is substituted for qn in the latent variable equation for order aggressiveness and the order
aggressivness equation is estimated via an ordered probit model.
2.2 Order Cancellation
To examine the order cancellation decision, we only need to model the latent variable for order 
aggressiveness.  Quantity is not a choice variable as traders can only cancel orders that were submitted 
earlier. Just as in the order submission case, the order aggressiveness is defined as:
Ic = 1 if  1
* ~ µ ≤ < ∞ − c I  (limit orders cancelled more than 2 pips from the best quote)
= 2 if  2
*
1
~ ~ µ µ ≤ < c I  (limit orders cancelled between (0,2] pips from the best quote)




c I µ (limit orders cancelled at the best order)
Though quantity is not a choice variable in the order cancellation decision, it could affect the decision of 




* c c I
s
I
c c x qn I ε β γ + + = (1’)
where
*
c I   is the latent variable for cancellation and the explanatory variables include those exogenous 
variables used in the model for the submission of orders and quantity, xs.
2.3  Hypothesis and control variables
Overall we expect that order aggressiveness is negatively related to quantity, because the
potential cost of large market orders is high – a large trade may reveal more information and may have to 
walk further up or down the order book to be completely executed. Although not as strong a concern, 
large, aggressive limit orders may also reveal more information and there is a larger potential cost of 
being picked off if the value of the asset moves against the dealer and he cannot cancel the larger order.
In studying the trade-off between order aggressiveness and quantity, we control for the impact on 
order aggressiveness and quantity decisions of volatility, spread and market depths at the best price.  The 
following are the control variables and how we expect them to impact dealers’ price and quantity choices:10
1. Volatility: We consider both the common realized volatility (the uncertainty of the value of the 
currency) and the residual volatility (the uncertainty affecting only the ask side or the bid side of 
the market).  The common realized volatility is the volatility of the mid-quote, the average of the 

















quote mid quote mid
i common .
The residual volatility is the volatility associated with only the ask side or the bid side of the 
market.  It is obtained as the residual of the regression of volatility from one side of the market on 
both the common volatility and the volatility from the opposite side of the market.  For example, 
the residual volatility from the ask side of the market is defined as the residual of the regression: 
ask bid common ask v v v ε β β α + + + = 2 1  where vcommon is defined as above and vbid and vask are
defined using the formula for v common but replacing p
midquote with p
bid and p
ask respectively. By 
construction, the residual volatility is orthogonal to both the common volatility and the volatility 
from the opposite side of the market. The residual volatility is a measure not considered in
previous studies and it is intended to capture the potentially asymmetric impact of uncertainty
affecting only one side of the market.
Hypothesis: As suggested by Foucault (1999), if the increase in uncertainty is due to an increase 
in the asymmetry of information across dealers, we should see an increase in the number of limit 
orders posted (i.e., orders submitted at less aggressive prices). On the other hand, Cohen et al. 
(1981) point out that as price uncertainty increases, risk-averse dealers place a premium on
certainty in the execution of their trades.  As a consequence, their model suggests we should see 
an increase in market orders (more aggressive orders) as volatility increases. Our analysis
determines which effect is stronger. Furthermore, by differentiating between the volatility coming 
from the bid and the ask sides of the market, we can more clearly investigate the potential impact 
of differences in the uncertainty coming from different sides of the market. 11
2. Depth at the best ask/ bid price: the number of ask and bid orders standing at the best price in the 
limit order book.
Hypothesis: An increase in depth available at the best price has two implications: first, a large 
market order is less costly because it is less likely to have to walk up/down the order book to be 
fully executed.  Second, it is more expensive to submit limit orders at the best price on the same 
side of the market because the increased depth at the best price means a longer queue for the 
order to be executed and thus greater execution risk. Consequently more depth should encourage
market orders initiated from the opposite side of the market but discourage limit orders at the best 
price on the same side of the market.
3. Depth at the off-best ask/ bid price: the number of ask and bid orders standing at off-best prices 
in the limit order book.
Hypothesis: The arguments are similar to the case of depth at the best price.  When there is more 
depth on the same side of the market, limit orders are relatively more expensive than market 
orders because of an increase in the execution risk and competition from the existing limit orders.
4. Spread: the spread between the best bid and ask prices
Hypothesis:  Since the best bid and best ask prices are cointegrated (e.g., Engle and Patton
(2004)), we expect that orders submitted following a widening of spread should improve the best 
prices to return the spread to its equilibrium value.  On the other hand, a larger bid-ask spread 
means a higher cost of submitting market orders since dealer have to pay half the spread when 
submitting market orders. Thus dealers would refrain from submitting market orders at these
times.
5. Hourly dummy:  Six hourly-dummies running from 10:00 to 16:00 (GMT) are created to capture 
differences in the order aggressiveness and quantity over the trading day. 
Hypothesis: Compared to the London opening hours, our base case, we expect order placements 
for the rest of the London trading session, 10:00-12:00 (GMT), to be less aggressive and continue 
to decrease until the close in New York.  This is because the asymmetry of information is widest 12
at the opening in London and narrows as trading updates the dealers’ information set (i.e.,
Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2004)).
For identification purposes, we add the following variables to examine how order aggressiveness
changes as prices change 
1. Proportion of positive (negative) price changes: the number of positive (negative) price changes 
within the past two minutes divided by the total number of quotes.
For the quantity equation, the variables we use for identification are the proportion of large best 
orders submitted on each side of the market. More specifically,
2. No. of large best ask (bid) orders/No. of all best ask (bid) orders: the number of large best ask 
(bid) orders, defined as orders over $1 million, divided by the total number of best ask (bid) 
orders submitted within the past two minutes.
2.4 Removing Seasonality
As is typical in microstructure studies, all the explanatory variables exhibit intra-day
seasonalities.  To compensate for this, the explanatory variables are deseasonalized using the method
proposed by Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992). The first step is to regress each variable on a series of 
adjustment variables as follows: 
u d x + = λ ' (3)
The adjustment variables used  are 9 hourly dummies,  d (a 1 9× vector), one for each of the hours
between 7:00 (GMT) and 16:00 (GMT). These dummies capture the hour-of-the-day effects of the
quoting and trading activities shown in Figure 1. To remove the heteroscedasticity in our variables, the 
residuals are used in the regression
v d u + = θ ' ) log(
2 (4)
where θ  are the coefficients associated with the hourly dummies. The adjusted or deseasonalized 
variables are then calculated as follows 13






x x x adj + = (5)
where x  is the unadjusted sample mean of the variables and  x δˆ  is the unadjusted sample standard
deviation. The adjusted series have the same sample mean and variance as the unadjusted series, but the 
effect of seasonality on the mean and variance is removed. 
2.5 Marginal Probability
To more clearly see how marginal changes in our explanatory variables affect the probability of 
order submission in each order aggressiveness category, we calculate the marginal probabilities:
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i µ ˆ  are the estimated thresholds and φ  is the normal distribution density. The marginal probabilities
allow us to explicitly determine how each variable affects the probability of submitting orders at each 
level of aggressiveness avoiding difficulties in interpreting the coefficients in the ordered probit model.
3. Empirical Findings
This section presents the results from the analysis of the order aggressiveness and the
corresponding quantity for the order submissions as well as for the order cancellations.
3.1 Order Submission14
The results from the estimation of the price and quantity decisions are presented in Table 5.  We 
first consider the ask side and the bid side of the market separately and then we estimate a model pooling 
both sides of the market.  The pooled model allows us to examine whether there are asymmetric responses 
across the ask side and bid side of the market using a set of slope dummy variables for observations 
coming from the ask side of the market.  When interpreting the results, a positive coefficient in the order 
aggressiveness (quantity) equation means that the factor increases the order aggressiveness (quantity) of 
the order submitted and a significant slope dummy indicates an asymmetry in the reaction between the 
ask and bid sides of the market.
Trade-off between price and quantity
After controlling for the state of the limit order book, order aggressiveness and quantity are 
negatively related to each other. The estimated coefficient on the aggressiveness variable is significantly 
negative in both the ask equation and the bid quantity equation (-1.10 and -0.93 respectively). The
estimated coefficients on quantity are also negative in the order aggressiveness equations, although not 
statistically significant. The marginal probability analysis in Table 7 shows that dealers submitting orders 
at more aggressive prices are more likely to submit smaller orders.  This suggests that dealers submit
aggressive orders with small quantities. 
There are two potential reasons why more aggressive orders are smaller: order splitting or order 
consolidating. In the order consolidation case, dealers submit small orders to fulfill immediate liquidity 
needs. In the order splitting case, dealers split their orders into smaller lots for information reason – large 
orders, as suggested in Easley and O’Hara (1992), may reveal more information.  Consequently dealers 
may break up large market orders into a string of smaller market orders to more gradually reveal their 
information. If the order book is resilient (i.e., the order book is refilled quickly after an order is filled) 
this breaking up of orders may also lower the execution cost.  Further penalizing large orders is the fact 
that large, aggressive limit orders have a larger risk of being picked off – the dealer losing when the value 
of the currency moves against the dealer and he is not able to cancel the order in time.  Consequently, 15
dealers put in small aggressive limit orders which have priority in execution and at the same time
minimize the pick-off risk. 
 As we do not know the identity of the dealer submitting an order, we examine the time series of 
order submission activities to determine whether order splitting or order consolidation account for this
finding. If it were order splitting, we would expect the placement of small orders to be positively
autocorrelated on the same side of the market. Dealers will submit a series of small orders until the order 
is completely executed. In the case of order consolidation, there is no theoretical reason why the orders 
would be autocorrelated on the same side of the market—dealers just submit a small order for liquidity 
reasons and subsequently leave the market. We employ a linear autoregressive model to examine the 
placement of $1 million orders in 10 second intervals. We count the number of $1-million market orders
5
and aggressive limit orders







t i t t x x ε ρ (12)
where t x  is the number of market orders or aggressive limit orders in the 10-second interval at time t. The 
estimation results in Table 4 show that the placement of both $1-million market orders and aggressive 
limit orders are positively autocorrelated. The 1
st-order autocorrelation coefficients on both sides of the 
market are around 0.3 and most of the autocorrelation coefficients are significantly positive at the 5% 
level or better. The findings therefore suggest that dealers split their orders to either hide their information 
or to decrease the execution costs.
Volatility
Table 5 shows that both bid and ask orders become significantly more aggressive and the quantity 
increases as volatility increases. At these times, best limit orders, marketable limit orders and market
orders are more likely to be submitted (Table 7). This finding suggests that dealers submitting orders 
place a premium on execution certainty when price uncertainty is increasing, consistent with the
hypothesis of Cohen et al. (1981). The pooled model suggests that the impact is asymmetric – the ask side 16
is significantly more aggressive than the bid side with the coefficient on the ask dummy on mid-quote
volatility being significantly positive (0.012).  On the quantity dimension, ask orders are submitted in 
smaller quantities: the ask dummy on mid quote volatility in the quantity equation is significantly
negative (-0.017). Therefore dealers selling the asset want to transact more quickly and in smaller
amounts than buy side dealers.  This indicates that dealers view overall market uncertainty differently 
depending on whether they wish to buy or sell the asset.
We also find that the choice of order aggressiveness and quantity respond differently to volatility 
from the different sides of the market. The residual volatility measure is defined to be orthogonal to both 
the common volatility and the volatility from the opposite side of the market, so it represents the price 
uncertainty arising from just the bid or just the ask side of the market. The results suggest that dealers are 
more adverse to being picked off when uncertainty comes from the same side of the market so they place
less aggressive orders. On the other hand, when the uncertainty is on the other side, dealers pick-off
orders on the opposite side of the market by placing more aggressive orders. Further, the pooled
submission result in Table 5 shows that the response of the two sides of the market is symmetric with the 
ask dummies not being statistically significant. As the residual volatility from the opposite side of the 
market increases, however, we see significantly more aggressive ask orders with larger quantities.
Depth at the best price
An increase in the depth at the best price on the same side of the market discourages both
aggressive orders and large orders – the coefficients in both the order aggressiveness and the quantity 
equations are significantly negative. Table 7 shows that the marginal probability of limit orders being
submitted at the best price drops as the depth increases. This is consistent with the “crowding out”
hypothesis of Parlour (1998): as the depth of best limit orders increases, the queue and thus the
competition for placing aggressive limit orders increases.  This increased competition results in dealers 
refraining from submitting aggressive limit orders. The effect is similar on both sides of the market.
Considering changes in the depth on the opposite side of the market, we find that an increase in 
the depth at the best price on the opposite side of the market encourages the submission of more17
aggressive orders with larger sizes. This is because market orders, for example, are less likely to have to 
walk up the order book, so the marginal cost of submitting market orders is lower. Similar to the case for 
changes in the depth on the same side of the market, the bid and ask sides of the market react
symmetrically in terms of both order aggressiveness and quantity.
Depth at the off-best price
The response of order aggressiveness to changes in the depth at the off-best prices is similar to 
that of changes in the depth at the best price. Orders are significantly more aggressive for changes in off-
best depth on the opposite side of the market but become less aggressive for changes in off-best depth on 
the same side of the market. The effect of changes in depth at the off-best prices is, however, much 
smaller than changes in depth at the best price.  In the ask order aggressiveness equation, for example, the 
coefficient on the depth at the off-best ask price (-0.0006) is less than one thirtieth the coefficient on the 
depth at the best ask price (-0.191).  The results suggest that either (i) changes in the depth at off-best
prices carry less information than at the best prices or (ii) changes in the off-best depth are less
transparent to market participants (dealers can not directly observe them so they react less to these
changes). Nevertheless, changes in off-best depth still significantly affect dealers’ order submission
strategies in the same direction as the changes at the best price.
The quantity of the orders reacts quite differently to the changes in depth at the off-best prices 
than it did for changes in the depth at the best prices.  The quantity for ask orders tends to be larger (with 
a p-value of 7%) when the off-best ask depth rises and it drops significantly when the off-best bid depth 
rises. In the bid equations, the bid quantity also increases significantly when the off-best bid depth rises. 
These are the opposite of the results for changes in the depth at the best price, where the quantity drops 
(rises) with increased depth on the same (opposite) side of the market. One possible explanation for this 
difference is that the depth at the off-best price on the other side of the market is a measure of the
marginal cost of executing large market orders. As a result, dealers tend to submit smaller orders to avoid 
walking up the order book when the depth deepens only at the off-best prices on the opposite side of the 
market while depth at the best price remains unchanged.18
Spread
Orders become more aggressive and larger in size when the spread widens. In fact, the marginal 
likelihood of a limit order being submitted at the best price or limit orders improving the best price
increases. This means that, following a widening of the spread, dealers observe the new information, 
update their information set and settle on new equilibrium price.  Based on this new price, dealers place
more at-best and improving-best limit orders, which eventually narrows the spread again. This is
consistent with the empirical findings in Engle and Patton (2004). Using equity data, they find that best 
bid and ask prices are cointegrated and they revert to their equilibrium value after a shock to the spread. 
Another interesting finding related to the spread is that the marginal likelihood for marketable 
limit orders and market orders also increases following a widening of the spread. This is contrary to the 
intuition that market orders become more expensive as the spread widens. The results suggest that dealers 
become more concerned about ensuring their orders are executed in an uncertain market as in Cohen et al. 
(1981).
Turning to the pooled submission results in Table 5, we find that the two sides of the market react 
symmetrically to changes in the spread in terms of order aggressiveness but not in terms of quantity. For 
the order aggressiveness equation, we find that the spread impacts order aggressiveness symmetrically –
the ask dummy related to spread is not significant. However, for the quantity equation, the ask dummy on 
spread is significantly negative (-0.0125). This suggests that the ask orders are significantly smaller than 
the bid orders when spread widens.
Time of Day Effects
We find that the nature of the order aggressiveness differs between the London and the New York 
markets. Ask orders are more aggressive during the most active hours in New York (12:00 to 15:00 
(GMT)) than during the most active hours in London (7:00 to 10:00 (GMT)). The bid aggressiveness is 
symmetric during their active hours. On the other hand, as market activity slows following the initial 19
surge at the opening in London and New York, from 10:00 to 12:00 and from 15:00 to 16:00 respectively, 
ask orders become less aggressive and bid orders become more aggressive. These results suggest that 
dealers placing bid orders become more concerned about being picked off over the day, since trading
reveals information, thereby reducing the information asymmetry through the trading day, especially at 
the close of the trading day. Thus they place more aggressive bid orders at these times. 
Proportion of Positive and Negative Price changes
We find that an increase in the proportion of positive price changes leads to ask (bid) orders being 
submitted at more (less) aggressive prices.  The reverse happens after negative price changes. To examine 
why this is the case, we run a regression of the present change in mid-quote prices on the previous
changes in the mid-quote:
i i i midquote midquote ε β + ∆ = ∆ −1 (13)
The autocorrelation coefficient, β  (-0.181), is significantly negative at the 1% level.  This suggests that 
when market participants see a series of positive price changes, they expect the price to revert in the 
future and thus place more aggressive sell orders. The opposite happens after a series of negative price 
changes.
Proportion of Large Bid/Ask orders 
When there are more large orders (orders larger than $1 million) on either side of the market, the 
subsequent order size increases. As described in Easley and O’Hara (1992), informed dealers tend to trade 
on the same side of the market and prefer to submit larger orders. Given an increasing proportion of large 
orders in the past two minutes, it could convey information so dealers are more confident and therefore 
submit larger orders.
3.2 Cancellation Decision
Because there is relatively little work on what factors affect the order cancellation decision, we 
have little theory to build on.  Nevertheless we use the theory related to order submissions to hypothesize 20
how order size, measures of market depth and price uncertainty affect the order cancellation decision.  We 
investigate the impact of these variables on the aggressiveness of the orders being cancelled in Table 6.
Quantity
As the quantity of unexecuted orders remaining in the market increases, we find that dealers are 
more likely to cancel less aggressive orders
7. Thus larger orders that are further behind the best price are 
more likely to get cancelled. Given that these orders are less likely to be executed, it is not surprising that 
these are more likely to be cancelled.
Price Volatility
We find that an increase in the overall level of price uncertainty leads to an increase in the 
cancellation of more aggressive orders. The result suggests that dealers are more concerned about price 
changes going against them and therefore being picked off at times of price uncertainty. This is
particularly evident in the equation where ask orders are cancelled at more aggressive prices when ask 
side volatility increases (with the statistically significant coefficient of -0.0618). Less aggressive ask
orders are also cancelled when the bid volatility increases (0.0754). This finding ties in with the order
submission decision. As the residual volatility from the opposite side of the market increases, dealers 
submit more aggressive orders to pick off orders on the opposite side of the market. At these times, ask 
dealers would therefore cancel their less aggressive ask orders and resubmit at more aggressive prices.
Depth at best/ off-best price
Cancellations are more active when there are changes in the depth on the same side of the market. 
Increased depth at the best price on the same side of the market leads to an increase in the cancellation of 
less aggressive bid and ask orders. Since increased depth at the best price implies that orders at less
aggressive prices are less likely to be hit, their execution risk increases so orders at off-best prices are 
more likely to be cancelled. 
On the other hand, increased depth at the off-best prices on the same side of the market leads to 
cancellations of more aggressive orders. Increased depth at the off-best prices on the same side of the 21
market indicates that more dealers are selling at a higher ask price or buying at a lower bid price than the 
current best prices. As a result, orders standing at the best price are more likely to suffer from pick-off
risk so dealers cancel aggressive orders to avoid being picked off.
Price change
We find that more aggressive bid (ask) orders and less aggressive ask (bid) orders are cancelled 
as the proportion of positive (negative) price changes is increasing. As found in equation (13), price 
changes tend to be negatively autocorrelated. With a series of positive price changes, dealers expect
prices to revert in the future. As a result, they cancel more aggressive bid orders to avoid the “pick-off”
risk. They also cancel less aggressive ask orders because they are less likely to be executed with a future
drop in price. We see the reverse when the price is decreasing.
4. The Role of Market Performance
In this section, we examine how dealers trade-off order aggressiveness and quantity as prices are 
changing. In the previous analyses we investigate the impact of a marginal change in factors related to 
market uncertainty and market depth on a dealer’s order placement strategy.  Since the impact of these
variables may depend on the state of the market (i.e., the impact may be different if prices are rising rather
than falling), we investigate the possibility that, for example, the effect of an increase in volatility in a 
rising market may be different from an increase in a falling market. To examine the role of market
performance, we create three dummy variables,  1 d , 2 d  and  3 d , to capture whether the market is rising, 
falling or relatively stable. These dummies are determined by fitting the following price trend regression 
to all of the mid-quotes submitted over the past two-minute interval
ε βτ α + + = − t t quote mid p , (13)
where t quote mid p , −  is the mid-point of the best prices at time t and t τ is the distance in seconds between
the (t-1)
st and t
th orders during the two minute interval. The value of β would be positive if the mid-quote
price is increasing over this interval, negative if the price is decreasing and not significantly different 22
from zero if the price does not follow an apparent trend.  As a result, we use this regression to define the 
dummy variables as follows: 
 d 1 = 1 if E ˆ  is significantly positive, d1 = 0 otherwise 
 d 2 = 1 if E ˆ  is significantly negative, d2 = 0 otherwise 
 d 3 = 1 if E ˆ  is not statistically different from zero, d3 = 0 otherwise 
Since the changes in order aggressiveness have been found to depend on many factors, we supplement 
model (1) by adding the interaction between the market performance dummy variables and both the 
measures of volatility and market depth.  As a result the order aggressiveness regression estimated earlier 
now becomes
* * * * * * *
' ' ' 3 2 1 1







s x d x d x d qn I H E E E J           (14) 








s s x b d x b d x b d I a qn H J        ' ' ' 3 2 1
*
2    (15) 
4.1  Empirical Findings of the Role of Market Performance 
We find that past price changes provide insight into the future market performance of an asset.  
Our model characterizes how this information influences the impact of our explanatory variables on the 
dealers’ price and quantity decisions when submitting orders (see Table 8).  
Volatility
There are three major findings with respect to overall volatility. The first finding is that increases 
in the overall volatility lead to an increase in the order aggressiveness of both the bid and ask prices when 
prices are relatively stable (e.g., when there is little new information arriving).  This suggests that dealers 
are most worried about execution risk when the overall price level is constant but the uncertainty of prices 
is increasing.  The second finding is that in a rising and volatile market, ask orders tend to be smaller (the 
coefficient in the ask quantity equation is significantly negative with a value of -0.1034). This suggests 
that dealers minimize their risk of being picked-off at these times by placing smaller sell orders. The third 23
finding is that overall volatility only impacts the bid order submission decision when prices are falling.
Bid orders are more aggressive when prices are falling (the related coefficient (0.039) is significantly 
positive at the 1% level) and larger size (related coefficient (0.0782) is significantly positive at the 5%
level).  Dealers therefore appear to view periods when the prices are volatile and falling as buying
opportunities.
Considering volatility from just one side of the market, we find that both bid and ask orders
become less aggressive as same-side volatility increases when the price trend is constant. This suggests 
that dealers want to avoid being picked-off when there is uncertainty about the value of the asset from the 
same side of the market (i.e., the coefficients of same side residual volatility, -0.0661 for ask orders and -
0.1007 for bid orders, are both significantly negative at the 1% significance level). On the other hand, 
both bid and ask orders become more aggressive as the opposite side residual volatility increases when 
the price trend is constant (the coefficients for opposite side residual volatility are (0.0073) for ask orders 
and (0.0084) for bid orders and are both significantly positive at the 1% significance level). When there 
are trends in prices we only find an impact on ask submissions.  Ask orders become more aggressive with 
increased opposite side volatility when the price is falling suggesting that dealers are trying to take 
advantage of price uncertainty on the opposite side of the market – they are trying to pick-off the highest 
bid orders as the price falls.  This will minimize their losses if the price settles at a lower level.
Depth at the best price
When there is more depth at the best ask price, ask orders become less aggressive regardless of 
price movements (coefficients are all negative at the 10% significance level) and they are smaller in
quantity (coefficients are all negative at 2% significance level). Thus ask orders are placed at prices
further away from the best price to avoid competition with the existing best orders standing in the market.
The submission of bid orders also responds to changes in the best ask depth in all market conditions. Bid
orders become more aggressive and come in larger size with increasing ask depth (the related coefficients 
are all positive at the 5% significance level). More depth at the best ask price would decrease the24
execution risk of dealers’ buy orders especially if the increased depth on the ask side is a signal of future 
changes in the market. 
When the depth at the best bid price is increasing, ask (bid) orders become more (less) aggressive 
independent of the market conditions. This result indicates that changes in the depth at the best bid price 
contain a significant amount of information for the order submission decision.  The ask (bid) quantity also 
becomes significantly larger (smaller) when the price trend is constant or decreasing. Ask orders are
larger because there is less risk of walking down the order book with a deeper best bid depth even in a 
declining market. Bid orders are smaller to avoid exposure to pick-off risk in a declining market.  These 
results suggest that dealers wishing to sell (buy) the asset try to avoid price (pick-off) risk as the depth 
increases on the bid side.
Depth at off- best prices
Similar to the baseline order submission model, the impact of depth at off-best ask prices is
smaller in magnitude than depth at best ask price. The impact on order aggressiveness is concentrated at 
the times when prices are constant. When the market is deeper at off-best ask prices, ask (bid) orders 
become significantly less (more) aggressive. Similarly, depth at the off-best bid prices has a significant 
positive (negative) impact on ask (bid) aggressiveness when the price is constant. Ask (bid) orders
become more (less) aggressive when the market is calm. The intuition for the results is similar to the case 
of depth at best price.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate two of the most important components of a dealer’s order submission 
decision – the aggressiveness of the price and the quantity at which dealers are willing to transact.
Despite the importance of the quantity decision for every order submitted, this aspect of the order
submission decision has received relatively little attention in the microstructure literature.  Using a
simultaneous equation model, we investigate the factors influencing the dealers’ order submission and 25
cancellation decisions concerning both the aggressiveness of prices and the associated quantity as well as 
how they interact.
The data comes from firm quotes submitted to the Reuters D-2000-2 system in the Deutsche
Mark-U.S. dollar market. We find that dealers make negative trade offs between the price and quantity 
when submitting orders. Aggressive orders are submitted in smaller amounts. This is because (i) quantity
affects the price risk of market orders – a larger market order may have to walk up or down the book to 
ensure complete execution inducing price uncertainty. Quantity also affects the pick-off risk of limit
orders, because larger limit orders suffer larger losses when the efficient price moves against the order.  In 
a related fashion, we find that changes in the depth of the market and the price uncertainty on each side of 
the market have a significant impact on the price and quantity of submitted orders. Depth on the opposite 
side of the market encourages more aggressive orders of larger size. The opposite happens when depth 
accumulates on the same side of the market. This supports the “crowding-out” hypothesis in Parlour
(1998) and Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2004). Although changes in the off-best depth are not observable 
to the dealers, they still significantly affect the order aggressiveness and quantity decision. This suggests 
that dealers use sources of information other than the Reuters screen (e.g. private information from their 
customers).
For the order cancellation decision we find that there are several factors influencing which orders 
dealers cancel.  Although quantity is not an explicit component of this decision, we do find that dealers
are more likely to cancel orders that are less likely to be executed based on factors such as their size, the 
expected future price changes and liquidity changes.  If dealers believe the future price will be increasing, 
for example, dealers are more (less) likely to cancel orders that are behind the best bid (ask) price and 
thus are less (more) likely to be executed.26
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Footnotes:
1  The differences between prices are discrete increments.  In equity markets prices depend on the tick size and in the 
foreign exchange market prices are in increments of 1 pip where for our data 1 pip is DM 0.0001 per US dollar.
2  Our model for order cancellations contains only an ordered probit model because dealers can only remove existing 
orders.  Although how much to remove is not a choice, our model does recognize that the quantity standing in the 
market for each order is a major factor affecting the cancellation decision for orders at different price levels.
3  However, the identity of the dealer is anonymous. We cannot distinguish who is submitting an order.
4 As we do not have the identity of the trader, we can only examine whether dealers are splitting orders by statistical 
measures.
5 Market orders here refers to both market orders and marketable limit orders.
6 Aggressive limit orders here refers to limit orders at the best price and limit orders improving the best price.
7 A positive value for the estimated coefficients denotes the cancellation of a more aggressive order.30
Figure 1:
This graph presents the average number of orders submitted in each half hour time bin using the 



















































































Table I: Order Aggressiveness and Quantity
The table presents the proportion of orders submitted and cancelled in terms of order aggressiveness and 
quantity. Panel A presents the proportion of order submitted. Orders aggressiveness are divided into six
order aggressiveness category: market orders, marketable limit orders, limit orders improving the best
price, limit orders at the best price, limit orders within 1 pip of best price and limit orders more than 1 pip 
from bst price. The proportion of quantity is divided into three categories: quantity equal to 1 million, 
quantity equal to 2 million and quantity greater than and equal to 3 million. Panel B presents the
proportion of orders cancelled. Cancellation is divided into 3 categories: limit orders cancelled at the best 
price, limit order cancelled within 2 pips of the best price and limit orders cancelled at more than 2 pips 
from the best price. The data comesfrom the Reuters D-2000-2 electronic brokerage system for the week of 
October 6-10, 1997. 
Panel A: Order submission
proportion of 
aggressiveness




limit order more 1 pip from best price 0.24 0.64 0.19 0.17
limit order within 1 pip of best price 0.11 0.52 0.25 0.23
limit order at best price 0.23 0.50 0.26 0.25
limit order improving best price 0.14 0.41 0.29 0.30
marketable limit order 0.11 0.34 0.27 0.40
Market order 0.17 0.55 0.25 0.20
Ask
limit order more 1 pip from best price 0.23 0.65 0.18 0.17
limit order within 1 pip of best price 0.11 0.53 0.25 0.22
limit order at best price 0.23 0.50 0.26 0.24
limit order improving best price 0.15 0.42 0.28 0.30
marketable limit order 0.11 0.33 0.26 0.40
market order 0.17 0.55 0.25 0.20
Bid
limit order more 1 pip from best price 0.25 0.63 0.19 0.18
limit order within 1 pip of best price 0.11 0.51 0.26 0.23
limit order at best price 0.23 0.50 0.25 0.25
limit order improving best price 0.14 0.39 0.31 0.30
marketable limit order 0.11 0.34 0.27 0.39
market order 0.17 0.55 0.24 0.2032
Panel B: Order cancellation
proportion of 
aggressiveness




limit order more 2 pip from best price 0.34 0.62 0.20 0.19
limit order within 2 pip of best price 0.30 0.47 0.26 0.27
limit order at best price 0.36 0.38 0.29 0.33
Ask
limit order more 2 pip from best price 0.33 0.63 0.19 0.18
limit order within 2 pip of best price 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.28
limit order at best price 0.37 0.38 0.29 0.33
Bid
limit order more 2 pip from best price 0.35 0.61 0.20 0.19
limit order within 2 pip of best price 0.30 0.47 0.26 0.26
limit order at best price 0.36 0.37 0.30 0.3333
Table II: Intra-day Proportion of Orders by Order aggressiveness and Quantity Category
The table shows the proportion of orders submitted for the Deutsche Mark-US dollar quotes in the
Reuters D-2000-2 system falling into each order aggressiveness category and the proportion of quantity at 
each hourly interval. Orders aggressiveness are divided into six order aggressiveness category: market 
orders, marketable limit orders, limit orders improving the best price, limit orders at the best price, limit 
orders within 1 pip of best price and limit orders more than 1 pip from bst price. T he proportion of
quantity is divided into three categories: quantity equal to 1 million, quantity equal to 2 million and
quantity greater than and equal to 3 million.
Order submission
Limit order 
















order qn=1 qn=2 qn>=3
7:00 0.23 0.11 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.19 0.55 0.22 0.23
8:00 0.26 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.55 0.22 0.23
9:00 0.22 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.54 0.21 0.24
10:00 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.55 0.22 0.23
11:00 0.26 0.10 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.53 0.22 0.25
12:00 0.24 0.11 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.48 0.26 0.26
13:00 0.24 0.13 0.24 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.48 0.27 0.25
14:00 0.23 0.11 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.46 0.28 0.26
15:00 0.22 0.08 0.22 0.26 0.07 0.14 0.48 0.33 0.20
Order cancellation
Limit order 
more than 2 
pips from the 
best price
Limit order 
within 2 pips 
of best price Best orders qn=1 qn=2 qn>=3
7:00 0.36 0.31 0.33 0.53 0.21 0.26
8:00 0.38 0.31 0.30 0.54 0.21 0.25
9:00 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.54 0.20 0.26
10:00 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.55 0.20 0.25
11:00 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.52 0.21 0.27
12:00 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.45 0.27 0.28
13:00 0.33 0.31 0.37 0.45 0.28 0.27
14:00 0.31 0.30 0.40 0.41 0.30 0.29
15:00 0.29 0.23 0.48 0.45 0.35 0.2034
Table III: Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables
For each of the explanatory variables defined in section 2, we present the mean, standard
deviation, maximum, median and minimum values.  These were obtained using the data from the 
Reuters D-2000-2 electronic brokerage system for the week of October 6-10, 1997. Common
















quote mid quote mid
i common . The mid-
quote is the average of the best bid and best ask quotes standing in the market at the time every 
order submitted during the past 2 minutes before order i is submitted. Residual volatility is the 
volatility associated with only the ask or the bid side of the market.  It is obtained as the residual of the 
regression of volatility from one side of the market on both the common volatility and the volatility from 
the opposite side of the market. Best (Off-best) depth the number of ask and bid quotes standing at the 
best (off-best) price in the limit order book. Spread is the difference between the best bid price and the 
best ask price. Proportion of positive (negative) price change is the number of positive (negative) price 
changes within the past two minutes divided by the total number of quotes submitted within the past two 
minutes. The proportion of large ask (bid) orders is the number of best ask (bid) orders submitted with a 
size larger than $1 million divided by the total number of best ask (bid) orders submitted within the past 
two minutes
mean std max med min
Common volatility* 1.93 1.30 9.12 1.56 0.00
Residual ask price volatility 0.06 0.22 2.92 0.05 -0.71
Residual bid price volatility 0.05 0.20 2.75 0.04 -1.41
Depth at best ask price 1.91 1.33 14.00 1.00 1.00
Depth at best bid price 1.94 1.37 21.00 1.00 1.00
Depth at off best ask price 42.08 11.10 83.00 42.00 2.00
Depth at off best bid price 45.05 12.57 88.00 44.00 3.00
Spread* 2.07 1.69 30.00 2.00 0.00
proportion of positive price change** 18.30 5.10 57.14 18.06 0.00
proportion of negative price change** 18.17 4.94 62.50 17.86 0.00
proportion of large ask orders** 49.82 13.07 100.00 49.32 0.00
proportion of large bidorders** 50.34 13.01 100.00 50.00 0.00
* variable measured in pips




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table VI: Order Cancellation
The results from the estimation of 
* *
' 3
* c c I
s
I
c c x qn I ε β γ + + =
for order cancellation using ordered probit model. 
*
c I  is the latent aggressiveness of order cancellation.  s x  are the 
explanatory variables for order aggressivness in cancellation. Their definitions are provided in Table 3. H10 to 
H15 in the table represents the hourly dummy running from 10:00 (GMT) to 16: 00 (GMT). The equantion is estimated 
for both the order cancellation decision on both the ask and bid sides of the market, as well as pooling the ask and the 
bid side together using the data from the Reuters D-2000-2 electronic brokerage system for the week of October 6-10,
1997.
Ask Bid Pooled
Parameter Estimate ProbChiSq Estimate ProbChiSq Estimate ProbChiSq
qn -0.0758 0.00 -0.0836 0.00 -0.0795 0.00
Mid-quote volatility 0.0516 0.00 0.0578 0.00 0.0562 0.00
Residual same (ask) side volatility -0.0618 0.00 0.0223 0.22 0.0391 0.05
Residual opposite (bid) side volatility 0.0754 0.00 0.0399 0.05 0.0196 0.26
Depth at best same (ask) side price -0.0442 0.00 -0.0017 0.43 -0.0372 0.00
Depth at best opposite (bid)  side price 0.0014 0.54 -0.0418 0.00 -0.0014 0.51
Depth at off best same (ask)  side price 0.0035 0.00 -0.0006 0.10 0.0030 0.00
Depth at off best opposite (bid) side 
price -0.0002 0.48 0.0034 0.00 -0.0007 0.05
Spread 0.0003 0.79 0.0000 0.99 0.0006 0.74
proportion of positive price change  -0.0080 0.00 0.0023 0.01 0.0025 0.00
proportion of negative price change  0.0043 0.00 -0.0055 0.00 -0.0053 0.00
Dummy Mid-quote volatility -0.0028 0.61
Dummy residual same (ask) side 
volatility -0.1034 0.00
Dummy residual opposite (bid) side 
volatility 0.0522 0.05
Dummy depth at best same (ask) side 
price -0.0010 0.75
Dummy depth at best opposite (bid)
side price 0.0024 0.44
Dummy depth at off best same (bid)
side price 0.0000 0.98
Dummy depth at off best opposite
(ask) side price 0.0006 0.17
Dummy Spread -0.0016 0.54
Dummy proportion of positive price 
change -0.0109 0.00
Dummy proportion of negative price 
change 0.0096 0.00
h10 -0.0707 0.02 -0.0589 0.05 -0.0655 0.00
h11 -0.0677 0.02 -0.0018 0.95 -0.0351 0.08
h12 -0.0969 0.00 -0.0748 0.00 -0.0868 0.00
h13 -0.0483 0.03 -0.1702 0.00 -0.1088 0.00
h14 -0.1509 0.00 -0.1971 0.00 -0.1775 0.00
h15 -0.4012 0.00 -0.2725 0.00 -0.3317 0.0040
Table VII Marginal Probability
This table shows the marginal reactions of order aggressiveness in each category to a change in the explanatory 
variables. Orders aggressiveness are divided into six order aggressiveness category: market orders, marketable limit 
orders, limit orders improving the best price, limit orders at the best price, limit orders within 1 pip of best price and 
limit orders more than 1 pip from best price. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in Table 3. The








pip of best 
price
Limit order 









quantity 0.0691 0.0299 -0.0285 -0.0249 -0.0201 -0.0255
Mid-quote volatility -0.0045 -0.0019 0.0019 0.0016 0.0013 0.0017
Residual ask volatility 0.0136 0.0059 -0.0056 -0.0049 -0.0039 -0.0050
Residual bid volatility -0.0364 -0.0157 0.0150 0.0131 0.0106 0.0134
Depth at best ask price 0.0051 0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0019
Depth at best bid price -0.0024 -0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 0.0007 0.0009
Depth at off best ask price 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
Depth at off best bid price -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Spread -0.0034 -0.0015 0.0014 0.0012 0.0010 0.0012
proportion of positive price change -0.0033 -0.0014 0.0014 0.0012 0.0009 0.0012
proportion of negative price change  0.0033 0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0012
h10 0.0201 0.0087 -0.0083 -0.0072 -0.0058 -0.0074
h11 0.0091 0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0033 -0.0026 -0.0033
h12 -0.0128 -0.0056 0.0053 0.0046 0.0037 0.0047
h13 -0.0363 -0.0157 0.0150 0.0131 0.0105 0.0134
h14 -0.0145 -0.0063 0.0060 0.0052 0.0042 0.0053























quantity 0.0249 0.0107 -0.0096 -0.0084 -0.0073 -0.0103
Mid-quote volatility -0.0010 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
Residual ask volatility -0.0104 -0.0045 0.0040 0.0035 0.0030 0.0043
Residual bid volatility 0.0259 0.0112 -0.0100 -0.0088 -0.0076 -0.0108
Depth at best ask price -0.0025 -0.0011 0.0010 0.0008 0.0007 0.0010
Depth at best bid price 0.0048 0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0020
Depth at off best ask price -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
Depth at off best bid price 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Spread -0.0031 -0.0013 0.0012 0.0010 0.0009 0.0013
proportion of positive price change 0.0032 0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0013
proportion of negative price change  -0.0036 -0.0015 0.0014 0.0012 0.0010 0.0015
h10 -0.0258 -0.0111 0.0100 0.0087 0.0075 0.0107
h11 -0.0262 -0.0113 0.0101 0.0089 0.0076 0.0109
h12 -0.0080 -0.0034 0.0031 0.0027 0.0023 0.0033
h13 0.0016 0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0007
h14 -0.0010 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
h15 -0.0197 -0.0085 0.0076 0.0067 0.0057 0.008241
Table VIII Market Performance 
This table shows the order submission strategies when price change is positive, negative or constant. The system of 
equations estimated is 
* * * * * * *
' ' ' 3 2 1 1















s s x b d x b d x b d I a qn ε γ + + + + + = ' ' ' 3 2 1
*
2  for quantity using censored regression model
where
*
s I  is the latent order aggressiveness and  s qn
*  is the latent quantity, 
*
s I
s x  and 
qn
s x  are the explanatory variables 
for order aggressivness equation and quantity equation, 1 d , 2 d  and  3 d  are the dummies for positive, negative and 
constant price change. Their definitions are provided in Table 3. The system of equations are estimated for both the 
order submission decision on both the ask and bid sides of the market using the data from the Reuters D-2000-2










s qn -0.0014 0.99
*
s I -1.1251 0.00
Mid-quote volatility positive 0.0094 0.49 Mid-quote volatility positive -0.1034 0.01
negative 0.0075 0.66 negative -0.0062 0.89
constant 0.0174 0.00 constant 0.0057 0.53
Residual ask volatility positive 0.0511 0.60 Residual ask volatility positive -0.5594 0.07
negative -0.0302 0.76 negative 0.2182 0.46
constant -0.0661 0.00 constant -0.0035 0.94
Residual bid volatility positive -0.0577 0.53 Residual bid volatility positive -0.2225 0.44
negative 0.2104 0.05 negative 0.1014 0.76
constant 0.1242 0.00 constant 0.0214 0.69
Depth at best ask price positive -0.0121 0.02 Depth at best ask price positive -0.0385 0.02
negative -0.0122 0.08 negative -0.0501 0.02
constant -0.0214 0.00 constant -0.0258 0.00
Depth at best bid price positive 0.0161 0.02 Depth at best bid price positive 0.0303 0.16
negative 0.0092 0.09 negative 0.0485 0.00
constant 0.0073 0.00 constant 0.0460 0.00
Depth at off best ask price positive 0.0007 0.43 Depth at off best ask price positive -0.0018 0.54
negative -0.0008 0.44 negative 0.0027 0.38
constant -0.0008 0.01 constant 0.0017 0.06
Depth at off best bid price positive 0.0008 0.39 Depth at off best bid price positive -0.0017 0.57
negative 0.0018 0.06 negative -0.0056 0.05
constant 0.0022 0.00 constant -0.0016 0.08
Spread positive 0.0051 0.23 Best Bid-Min Bid positive 0.0322 0.01
negative 0.0130 0.00 negative -0.0088 0.49
constant 0.0121 0.00 constant 0.0006 0.88
proportion of positive
price change  positive 0.0056 0.02
proportion of large ask 
orders positive 0.0141 0.00
negative 0.0116 0.00 negative 0.0149 0.00
constant 0.0119 0.00 constant 0.0105 0.00
proportion of negative
price change  positive 0.0054 0.10
proportion of large bid 
orders positive 0.0035 0.25
negative -0.0111 0.00 negative 0.0016 0.66











s qn -0.0240 0.85
*
s I -1.0433 0.00
Mid-quote volatility positive -0.0158 0.21 Mid-quote volatility positive 0.0610 0.08
negative 0.0390 0.01 negative 0.0782 0.05
constant 0.0025 0.42 constant 0.0077 0.37
Residual ask volatility positive 0.0219 0.81 Residual ask volatility positive 0.2859 0.28
negative 0.0310 0.73 negative 0.3091 0.24
constant 0.0370 0.01 constant 0.0647 0.12
Residual bid volatility positive -0.0978 0.32 Residual bid volatility positive -0.2539 0.37
negative 0.0631 0.50 negative -0.0676 0.82
constant -0.1007 0.00 constant -0.1151 0.03
Depth at best ask price positive 0.0094 0.05 Depth at best ask price positive 0.0383 0.01
negative 0.0193 0.00 negative 0.0481 0.02
constant 0.0084 0.00 constant 0.0495 0.00
Depth at best bid price positive -0.0225 0.00 Depth at best bid price positive -0.0295 0.20
negative -0.0228 0.00 negative -0.0285 0.04
constant -0.0172 0.00 constant -0.0231 0.00
Depth at off best ask price positive 0.0003 0.71 Depth at off best bid price positive -0.0041 0.14
negative -0.0005 0.58 negative -0.0002 0.95
constant 0.0015 0.00 constant -0.0008 0.39
Depth at off best bid price positive -0.0011 0.26 Depth at off best ask price positive 0.0044 0.13
negative 0.0026 0.00 negative 0.0036 0.17
constant -0.0001 0.55 constant 0.0025 0.00
Spread positive 0.0092 0.02 Best Bid-Min Bid positive 0.0409 0.00
negative 0.0064 0.11 negative 0.0098 0.43
constant 0.0115 0.00 constant 0.0081 0.03
proportion of positive
price change  positive -0.0048 0.03
proportion of large ask 
orders positive -0.0053 0.10
negative -0.0050 0.16 negative 0.0010 0.72
constant -0.0120 0.00 constant 0.0017 0.03
proportion of negative
price change  positive 0.0078 0.02
proportion of large bid 
orders positive 0.0095 0.00
negative 0.0078 0.00 negative 0.0093 0.01
constant 0.0131 0.00 constant 0.0104 0.00